1.0 INTRODUCTION
Under the Enhanced Proliferation Control Initiative (EPCI), a U.S.
export license can be required an exporter if "knows or has reason to know" that
an export or re-export will involve nuclear, missile, or chemical/biological
weaponry end uses or end users. The export controls also prohibit performance
of contracting, service, and support that assists in proliferation activities.
"Knowledge" of EPCI concerns goes beyond positive knowledge and
includes an awareness that an item might be used for proliferation
activities. Knowledge can be inferred from evidence that a person avoided or
disregarded information indicating an EPCI concern.
2.0 RESTRICTED END USES AND END USERS
End uses involving the following activities or parties engaged in such activities
will require an export license:
Nuclear
Design, development, manufacture,
testing, or use of nuclear explosives, components, or
Development, design,
manufacture, construction, operation or maintenance of:
- a nuclear reactor
- critical facility for the fabrication of nuclear fuel
- facility for the conversion of nuclear material from one chemical
form to another, or
- separate storage installation
Where there is no obligation to accept International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) safeguards at the relevant facility or installation when it
contains any source or special fissionable material (regardless of whether
or not it contains such material at the time of export) or where any such
obligation is not met.
Safeguarded and unsafeguarded nuclear
fuel cycle activities, including research on or development, design,
manufacture, construction, operation or maintenance of any of the following
facilities, or components for such facilities:
- facilities for the chemical processing of irradiated special nuclear
or source material;
- facilities for the production of heavy water;
- facilities for the separation of isotopes of source and special
nuclear material; or
- facilities for the fabrication of nuclear reactor fuel containing plutonium.
Foreign maritime nuclear propulsion projects
-Maritime nuclear propulsion plants, their land prototypes, and special
facilities for their construction, support, or maintenance, including any
machinery, devices, components, or equipment specifically developed or
designed for use in such plants or facilities.
Chemical/Biological Weaponry
Activities related to chemical or biological
weapon research, design, development, production, testing, stockpiling, sale,
installation, operation, maintenance or use.
Missiles
The term 'missiles' includes but is not limited to rockets and unmanned air
vehicle systems
Activities or research related to
missile research, design, development, production, testing, stockpiling, sale,
installation, maintenance, operation or use.
Activities relating to ballistic
missile systems, space launch vehicles, and sounding rockets and unmanned air
vehicle systems, (including cruise missile systems, target drones, and
reconnaissance drones) capable of delivering at least 500 Kg payload to a range
of at least 300Km
Activities involving any of the following projects
in the countries listed below:
- China: M Series Missiles CSS-2
- India: Agni, Prithvi, SLV-3 Satellite Launch Vehicle, Augmented Satellite
Launch Vehicle (ASLV), Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle (PSLV), Geostationary
Satellite Launch Vehicle (GSLV)
- Iran: Surface-to-Surface Missile Project, Scud Development Project
- Korea, North: No Dong 1, Scud Development Project
- Pakistan: Hatf Series Missiles
Contracts, Services Involving Weapons of Mass
Destruction
Contract or services assisting with the design,
development, production, or use of nuclear, missiles, chemical/biological
weaponry devices.
In addition, ITS specialists review the following entities with special
caution since they have been identified by the U.S. Government as warranting
screening for EPCI activities.
Entities Who Warrant Screening For EPCI Activities As
Identified By the U.S. Government
· Institutes of science and technology
· Satellite application centers
· Space research organizations
· Liquid propulsion entities
· Telemetry, tracking, command networks
· Conventional weapons and armaments
· Research and development establishments
· Military Entities
· Radiological facilities
3.0 REQUIREMENTS FOR SUN PARTNERS, RESELLERS & DISTRIBUTORS
Partners who learn that Sun products will/may be used for proliferation activities shall not
ignore or prevent the flow of such information. Disregard of this information can worsen
potential enforcement proceedings and penalties.
If the order raises questions or uncertainties as to whether an EPCI concern exists,
Sun will require clarification and/or additional end use/end user information. The
order will remain on hold until ITS receives information to conclude that the
transaction poses no EPCI risks.
To the extent that the additionally requested information does not clearly indicate
whether the order is free of proliferation concerns, the ITS specialist may require
the end user to provide a signed Non-Proliferation Compliance Letter (NPCL).
4.0 NON-PROLIFERATION COMPLIANCE LETTER (NPCL)
The NPCL requires a responsible official from the end user company to provide written
assurances on company letterhead that Sun product will not be put to any nuclear,
missile, or chemical/biological weaponry uses. The order shall remain on hold pending
ITS' receipt of a signed, completed NPCL.
NPCL