EXPORT RESTRICTIONS

EPCI Concerns

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ENHANCED PROLIFERATION CONTROL INITIATIVE CONCERNS
(EPCI)


1.0 INTRODUCTION

Under the Enhanced Proliferation Control Initiative (EPCI), a U.S. export license can be required an exporter if "knows or has reason to know" that an export or re-export will involve nuclear, missile, or chemical/biological weaponry end uses or end users. The export controls also prohibit performance of contracting, service, and support that assists in proliferation activities.

"Knowledge" of EPCI concerns goes beyond positive knowledge and includes an awareness that an item might be used for proliferation activities. Knowledge can be inferred from evidence that a person avoided or disregarded information indicating an EPCI concern.

2.0 RESTRICTED END USES AND END USERS

End uses involving the following activities or parties engaged in such activities will require an export license:

    Nuclear

    Design, development, manufacture, testing, or use of nuclear explosives, components, or
    Development, design, manufacture, construction, operation or maintenance of:

      - a nuclear reactor

      - critical facility for the fabrication of nuclear fuel

      - facility for the conversion of nuclear material from one chemical form to another, or

      - separate storage installation

      Where there is no obligation to accept International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards at the relevant facility or installation when it contains any source or special fissionable material (regardless of whether or not it contains such material at the time of export) or where any such obligation is not met.

    Safeguarded and unsafeguarded nuclear fuel cycle activities, including research on or development, design, manufacture, construction, operation or maintenance of any of the following facilities, or components for such facilities:

      - facilities for the chemical processing of irradiated special nuclear or source material;

      - facilities for the production of heavy water;

      - facilities for the separation of isotopes of source and special nuclear material; or

      - facilities for the fabrication of nuclear reactor fuel containing plutonium.

    Foreign maritime nuclear propulsion projects

      -Maritime nuclear propulsion plants, their land prototypes, and special facilities for their construction, support, or maintenance, including any machinery, devices, components, or equipment specifically developed or designed for use in such plants or facilities.

    Chemical/Biological Weaponry

    Activities related to chemical or biological weapon research, design, development, production, testing, stockpiling, sale, installation, operation, maintenance or use.

    Missiles

    The term 'missiles' includes but is not limited to rockets and unmanned air vehicle systems

    Activities or research related to missile research, design, development, production, testing, stockpiling, sale, installation, maintenance, operation or use.

    Activities relating to ballistic missile systems, space launch vehicles, and sounding rockets and unmanned air vehicle systems, (including cruise missile systems, target drones, and reconnaissance drones) capable of delivering at least 500 Kg payload to a range of at least 300Km

    Activities involving any of the following projects in the countries listed below:

      - China: M Series Missiles CSS-2

      - India: Agni, Prithvi, SLV-3 Satellite Launch Vehicle, Augmented Satellite Launch Vehicle (ASLV), Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle (PSLV), Geostationary Satellite Launch Vehicle (GSLV)

      - Iran: Surface-to-Surface Missile Project, Scud Development Project - Korea, North: No Dong 1, Scud Development Project

      - Pakistan: Hatf Series Missiles

    Contracts, Services Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction

    Contract or services assisting with the design, development, production, or use of nuclear, missiles, chemical/biological weaponry devices.

    In addition, ITS specialists review the following entities with special caution since they have been identified by the U.S. Government as warranting screening for EPCI activities.

    Entities Who Warrant Screening For EPCI Activities As Identified By the U.S. Government

      · Institutes of science and technology

      · Satellite application centers

      · Space research organizations

      · Liquid propulsion entities

      · Telemetry, tracking, command networks

      · Conventional weapons and armaments

      · Research and development establishments

      · Military Entities

      · Radiological facilities

3.0 REQUIREMENTS FOR SUN PARTNERS, RESELLERS & DISTRIBUTORS

Partners who learn that Sun products will/may be used for proliferation activities shall not ignore or prevent the flow of such information. Disregard of this information can worsen potential enforcement proceedings and penalties.

If the order raises questions or uncertainties as to whether an EPCI concern exists, Sun will require clarification and/or additional end use/end user information. The order will remain on hold until ITS receives information to conclude that the transaction poses no EPCI risks. To the extent that the additionally requested information does not clearly indicate whether the order is free of proliferation concerns, the ITS specialist may require the end user to provide a signed Non-Proliferation Compliance Letter (NPCL).

4.0 NON-PROLIFERATION COMPLIANCE LETTER (NPCL)

The NPCL requires a responsible official from the end user company to provide written assurances on company letterhead that Sun product will not be put to any nuclear, missile, or chemical/biological weaponry uses. The order shall remain on hold pending ITS' receipt of a signed, completed NPCL.

NPCL